The Risk Assessment Review Group was organized by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on July 1, 1977, with four elements to its charter:
testimony, and wish to acknowledge the outstanding cooperation we have received from the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the nuclear industry, and concerned scientists and citizens.
We find that WASH-1400 was a conscientious and honest effort to apply the methods of fault-tree/event-tree analysis to an extremely complex system, a nuclear reactor, in order to determine the overall probability and consequences of an accident. We have reviewed the methodology, the data base, the statistical procedures, and the results.
We have found a number of sources of both conservatism and nonconservatism in the probability calculations in WASH-1400, which are very difficult to balance. Among the former are inability to quantify human adaptability during the course of an accident, and a pervasive regulatory influence in the choice of uncertain parameters, while among the latter are nagging issues about completeness, and an inadequate treatment of common cause failure. We are unable to define whether the overall probability of a core melt given in WASH-1400 is high or low, but we are certain that the error bands are understated. We cannot say by how much. Reasons for this include an inadequate data base, a poor statistical treatment, an inconsistent propagation of uncertainties throughout the calculation, etc.
Also, both the dispersion model for radioactive material and the biological effects model should be improved and updated before they are applied in the regulatory and licensing process.
We do find that the methodology, which was an important advance over earlier methodologies applied to reactor risks, is sound, and should be developed and used more widely under circumstances in which there is an adequate data base or sufficient technical expertise to insert crediLle subjective probabilities into the calculations. Even when only bounds for certain parameters can be obtained, the method is still useful if the results are properly stated. Proper application of the methodology can therefore provide a tool for the NRC to make the licensing and regulatory process more rational, in more properly matching its resources (research, quality assurance, inspection, licensing regulations) to the risks provided by the proper application of the methodology. NRC has moved somewhat in this direction, and we recommend a faster pace.
Among our other findings are the well-known one that WASH-1400 ,is inscrutable, and that it is very difficult to follow the detailed thread of any calculation through the report. This has made peer review very difficult, yet peer review is the best method of assuring the technical credibility of such a complex undertaking. In particular, we find that the Executive Summary is a poor description of the contents of the report, should not be portrayed as such, and has lent itself to misuse in the discussion of reactor risks.
In summary we find that the fault-tree/event-tree methodology is sound,* and both can and should be more widely used by NRC. The implementation of this. methodology in WASH-1400 was a pioneering step, but leaves much to be desired.
*One of us (F.v.H) is doubtful that the methodology can be implemented so as to
give a high level of confidence that the probability of core melt is well below the limit set by experience. FINDINGS WASH-1400 was a substantial advance over previous attempts to estimate the risks of the nuclear option. The methodology has set a framework that can be used more broadly to assess choices involving both technical consequences and impacts on humans.
WASH-1400 was largely successful in at least three ways: in making the study of reactor safety more rational, in establishing the topology of many accident sequences, and in delineating procedures through which quantitative estimates of the risk can be derived for those sequences for which a data base exists.
We are unable to determine whether the absolute probabilities of accident sequences in WASH-1400 are high or low, but we believe that the error bounds on those estimates are, in general, greatly understated. This is true in part because there is in many cases an inadequate data base, in part because of an inability to quantify common cause failures, and in part because of some questionable methodological and statistical procedures.
There are many sources of both conservatism and nonconservatism in WASH-1400 and we have no way of judging their relative magnitudes in the WASH-1400 probability estimates. For example, the treatment of common cause failures may be nonconservative, while the pervasive intrusion of regulatory conservatism throughout the report is a conservative factor. In addition, inability to quantify human adaptability during the course of an accident (as illustrated at Browns Ferry) and failure to take credit for this is a major source of conservatism. Despite its shortcomings, WASH-1400 provides at this time the most complete single picture of accident probabilities associated with nuclear reactors. The fault-tree/ event-tree approach coupled with an adequate data base is the best available tool with which to quantify these probabilities.
It should be noted that the dispersion model for radioactive material developed in WASH-1400 for reactor sites as a class cannot be applied to individual sites without significant refinement and sensitivity tests.
The biological effects models should be updated and improved in the light of new information.
After having studied the peer comments about some important classes of initiating events, we are unconvinced of the correctness of the WASH-1400 conclusion that they contribute negligibly to the overall risk. Examples include fires, earthquakes, and human accident initiation.
It is conceptually impossible to be complete in a mathematical sense in the construction of event-trees and fault-trees; what matters is the approach to completeness and the ability to demonstrate with reasonable assurance that only small contributions are omitted. This inherent limitation means that any calculation using this methodology is always subject to revision and to doubt as to its completeness.
WASH-1400 made clear the importance to reactor safety discussions of accident consequences other than early fatalities. Although potential consequences other than early fatalities of large releases of radioactivity into the atmosphere (thyroid damage, land contamination, delayed cancers, genetic defects, etc.) may not have been prominently displayed among the findings of WASH-1400, they are systematically calculated there for the first time. Our resulting increased understanding of the full spectrum of reactor accident consequences has implications for nuclear power plant design, siting, and planning-for mitigation of conseqences.
The statistical analysis in WASH-1400 leaves much to be desired. It suffers from a spectrum of problems, ranging from lack of data on which to base input distributions to the invention and use of wrong statistical methods. Even when the analysis is done correctly, it is often presented in so murky a way as to be very hard to decipher.
For a report of this magnitude, confidence in the correctness of the results can only come from a systematic and deep peer review process. The peer review process of WASH-1400 was defective in many ways and the review was inadequate.
Lack of scrutability is a major failing of the report, impairing both its usefulness and the quality of possible peer review.
The Executive Summary to WASH-1400, which is by far the most widely read part of the report among the public and policy makers, does not adequately indicate the full extent of the consequences of reactor accidents; and does not sufficiently emphasize the uncertainties involved in the calculation of their probability. It has therefore lent itself to misuse in the discussion of reactor risk.
WASH-1400 was directed to make a "realistic' estimate of risk. In the regulatory process, the usual conservatisms must be incorporated.
There have been instances in which WASH-1400 has been misused as a vehicle to judge the acceptability of reactor risks. In other cases it may have been used prematurely as an estimate of the absolute risk of reactor accidents without full realization of the wide band of uncertainties involved. Such use should be discouraged.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Re-evaluate NRC's inspection and quality assurance system and licensing criteria to determine the extent to which they incorporate those things that have been learned from WASH-1400 and other relevant literature.
Use WASH-1400 probabilistic methodology more effectively to guide the reactor safety research program so as to reduce the uncertainties in analysis, and to gain greater understanding of those points of risk uncovered.
Where there is an inadequate data base, the methodology of WASH-1400 can still be used to uncover the topology of accident sequences. In such cases the limits of knowledge should be stated, without pressure to quantify (other than bounding) that which is unquantifiable.
Communicate to the relevant branches of Government (e.g, Department of Energy) the desirability of performing risk assessments on electric generating technologies alternative to light-water reactors.
In general, avoid use of the probabilistic risk analysis methodology for the determination of absolute risk probabilities for subsystems unless an adequate data base exists and it is possible to quantify the uncertainties. However, the methodology can also be used for cases in which the-data base will only support a bounding analysis, and for other cases in the absence of any better information if the results are properly qualified.
Fault-tree/event-tree analyses should be among the principal means used to deal with generic safety issues, to formulate new regulatory requirements, to assess and revalidate existing regulatory requirements, and to evaluate new designs.
NRC should encourage closer coordination among the research and probabilistic analysis staff and the licensing and regulatory staff, in order to promote the effective use of these techniques.
The consequence model used in WASH-1400 should be substantially improved, and its sensitivities explored, before it is used in the regulatory process.
